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The Rights of Meretricious Spouses To
Wrongful Death Actions
The insistence on adherence to an older morality as the key to the court-
room was discarded shortly after the close of the Spanish Inquisition
and is clearly not the law of this state. 1
Judge Poch6
Meretricious spouses2 traditionally have been denied the same legal
rights and benefits as married couples. Yet, in recent years the Califor-
nia Legislature and judiciary have become increasingly concerned with
the rights and privileges of the meretricious spouse. In the fields of
housing,3 credit for housing,4 family relations,5 and contracts,6 legisla-
tive and judicial actions have tended to equalize the legal rights of mer-
etricious couples with those of their married counterparts.7 In
California, however, the wrongful death action has not been extended
to the meretricious spouse for the death of his or her partner.
The rationale for the denial of the wrongful death action to the mere-
tricious spouse is primarily based on a determination by the California
Supreme Court that the California Legislature intended to preclude ju-
1. Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 559, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65, 67 (1980).
2. The meretricious spouse traditionally has been defined as one who illicitly cohabits with
another with knowledge that the relationship does not constitute a valid marriage. See Comment,
Rights of the Putative and Aeretricious Svouse in Calfornia, 50 CALiF. L. Rnv. 866, 873 (1962).
Couples maintain meretricious relationships for a variety of reasons. A young couple may forego
marriage until one of them is financially able to support adequately the other. An elderly couple
may forego marriage because of a reduction or termination of retirement or death benefits without
which they cannot afford to live. A couple may view the meretricious relationship as a trial period
preceding marriage. Any of these reasons, or others, may induce a couple to enter into a meretri-
cious living arrangement. See generally Comment, Illicit Cohabitation" The Impact of the Vallera
and Keene Cases on the Rights of the feretricious Spouse, 6 U.C.D. L. Rav. 354, 354 (1973).
For purposes of this comment, the meretricious couple is defined as one that (I) agrees infor-
mally to be husband and wife and (2) cohabitates as husband and wife. In addition, the period of
time a relationship has been maintained, though valuable in proving that a meretricious relation-
ship has been established, will not be considered determinative. Persons fitting within this defini-
tion have expectations and suffer injuries similar to those of the legally married spouse.
3. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §12955(a)-(d),(f),(g). See generally Atkinson v. Kern County
Hous. Auth., 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976); Comment, Loss of Consortium and
Unmarried Cohabitors: An Examination of Tong v. Jocson, 14 U.S.F. L. REv. 133, 139-40 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Loss of Consortium].
4. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §12955(e).
5. See CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (Uniform Parentage Act). See generally Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Loss of Consortium, supra note 3, at 140.
6. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
7. See generally Loss of Consortium, supra note 3, at 139-42.
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dicial extension of the wrongful death remedy.' A recent California
Court of Appeal decision and two federal court decisions have cited
this determination as the basis for denying the wrongful death remedy
to a meretricious spouse under California law.9 The California
Supreme Court, however, has not specifically decided the rights of a
meretricious spouse under the wrongful death statute.' 0 Thus, the pos-
sibility of judicial extension of the wrongful death remedy to the mere-
tricious spouse has not been foreclosed."I
The federal court decisions applying California law have resulted in
discrimination against and harsh treatment of the meretricious
spouse. 12 These courts have differentiated the meretricious spouse and
married spouse by excluding the meretricious spouse from the class of
persons entitled to bring an action for wrongful death.'3 Since the only
difference betweeen the two types of spouses may be the lack of partici-
pation in a formal ceremony by the meretricious spouse, the state inter-
ests in requiring a marriage ceremony should be weighed against the
harsh effects resulting from such a distinction.' 4
The thesis of this comment is that the California courts should ex-
tend the wrongful death remedy to the meretricious spouse. This com-
8. See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 575, 565 P.2d 122, 129, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104
(1977). See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §377 (California Wrongful Death Act).
9. See Aspinall v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 625 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1980); Vogel v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 224, 225-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Harrod v. Pacific South-
west Airlines, Inc., 118 Cal. App. 3d 155, 173 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1981).
10. The California Supreme Court denied an appeal from a California Court of Appeal deci-
sion that held the meretricious spouse of a decedent is not an heir who may bring an action for
wrongful death under the wrongful death statute. See Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc.,
118 Cal. App. 3d 155, 173 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1981) (A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme
court after judgment in the district court of appeal was denied by the supreme court on July 29,
1981).
11. There is no jurisdiction in the United States that provides a wrongful death remedy for
persons who merely cohabit. See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1255 (1953). Even jurisdictions
that recognize common law marriage do not provide a wrongful death remedy for merely living
together with a member of the opposite sex. See id. at 1277-81. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
defined common law marriage by stating that
[m]arriage is in law a civil contract, and does not require any form of solemnization
before officers of a church or state, but it must be evidenced by words in the present
tense, uttered with a view and for the purpose of establishing the relation of husband and
wife....
Commonwealth v. Stump, 53 Pa. 132, 136 (1866). Other states require cohabitation, consumma-
tion, reputation as husband and wife, and assumption of marital duties. See generally 55 C.J.S.
Marriage §22(b), at 850-55 (1948). California allows only the putative spouse to enjoy the equita-
ble results achieved in common law marriage jurisdictions.
For purposes of the wrongful death statute, a putative spouse is the surviving spouse of a void
or voidable marriage who is found by the court to have believed in good faith that the marriage to
the decedent was valid. See Kunakoff v. Woods, 166 Cal. App. 2d 59, 63, 332 P.2d 773, 775
(1958); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §377(b)(2). See generally 32 CAL. JUR., Family Law §27, at 53-54
(3d ed. 1977).
12. See, e.g., Aspinall v. McDonell Douglas Corp., 625 F.2d 325; Vogel v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 224; 420 F. Supp. 880.
13. See 625 F.2d at 327-28; 450 F. Supp. at 226; 420 F. Supp. at 881.
14. See generally Weyrauch, Informal and Formal Marriage-An 4ppraisal of Trends in Fan-
ily Organization, 28 U. CHi. L. REV. 88, 109 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Weyrauch].
1981 / Meretricious Spouses
ment will analyze both the origins and histories of the common law
rule denying a right of recovery for wrongful death and the California
wrongful death statute. The analyses will establish that there was never
any logical basis for the common law rule precluding an action for
wrongful death and that the determination by the California Supreme
Court that the California Legislature intended to occupy the field of
wrongful death recovery is erroneous. This comment will then ex-
amine the inequitable results that are caused by a denial of the wrong-
ful death remedy to the meretricious spouse. This examination will
show that the harsh consequences outweigh the policy justifications
supporting the denial of the wrongful death remedy to the meretricious
spouse. This examination will be followed by a discussion of two
methods the California courts can use to extend the wrongful death
action to the meretricious spouse."5 Finally, the comment will conclude
that the California courts have the power and the duty to include the
meretricious spouse in the class of persons entitled to maintain an ac-
tion for wrongful death.
REPUDIATION OF THE COMMON LAW RULE DENYING A CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
The denial of a cause of action in wrongful death for a meretricious
spouse is primarily based on the old common law rule prohibiting such
a remedy for any person. California courts, however, can judicially
extend the existing statutory remedy by holding that: (1) subsequent
developments have completely reversed the common law rule; and
(2) the California wrongful death statute was not intended by the legis-
lature to serve as the sole means of recovery. Initially, this comment
will examine the origin and history of the common law rule denying a
15. Although it is beyond the scope of this comment, a third argument has been advanced for
the judicial extension of the wrongful death remedy to the meretricious spouse: the wrongful
Death Act's exclusion of meretricious spouses is a denial of equal protection of the laws. The
California Court of Appeal concluded that:
The Legislature may decide who is entitled to sue for wrongful death, and its determina-
tion must be upheld if it is rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of placing
reasonable limits on the right to recover for wrongful death. [citations omitted]. The
exclusion of a decedent's meretricious spouse from the class of persons entitled to sue for
wrongful death is a reasonable limitation by the Legislature on a right it has created.
The Legislature could reasonably conclude a relationship which the parties have chosen
not to formalize by marriage lacks the necessary permanence to allow the survivor to
recover damages for wrongful death-damages which look to the future and are intended
to compensate for future loss. In addition, an action based on a meretricious relationship
presents greater problems of proof and dangers of fraudulent claims than an action by a
spouse or putative spouse. Finally, the exclusion of meretricious spouses is reasonably
related to the state's legitimate interest in promoting marriage. [citations omitted].
Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc., 118 Cal. App. 3d 155, 157-58, 173 Cal. Rptr. 68, 69-70
(1981); see 450 F. Supp. 224, 226; Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 580-82, 565 P.2d 122, 133-34,
139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 108-09 (1977); Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d 115, 123-24, 524 P.2d 801,
806, 115 Cal. Rptr. 329, 334 (1974).
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cause of action for wrongful death to demonstrate that no logical justi-
fications exist for perpetuating the common law rule.
A. Historical Reasonsfor the Common Law Rule
In the 1808 case of Baker v. Bolton,'16 Lord Ellenborough stated that
"[iln a civil Court, the death of a human being could not be com-
plained of as an injury ... .17" The ruling by Lord Ellenborough, is-
sued without citing authority, 8 originated the common law rule
denying a right of recovery for the tortious death of a human being. 19
Three arguments were used to perpetuate the common law rule.
First, a civil suit for wrongful death was considered precluded by the
common law doctrine of merger.2" Second, the courts believed that a
pecuniary value could not be placed on human life.2' Third, personal
actions were believed to die with the decedent.22 These three argu-
ments, however, are presently inadequate to persuade a court to deny a
civil action for tortious death.
In early English law, a homicide was regarded more as a criminal
offense against the state than as a civil offense.3 Since "negligence," in
its modem sense, did not exist at that time, almost every accidental
killing was a criminal homicide.24 The punishment for criminal homi-
cide included the forfeiture of the defendant's property to the Crown.25
To permit subsequent civil actions for judgments that could never be
satisfied would have been an empty action.26 The justifications for the
merger rule in England, however, never existed in the United States. 27
Forfeiture of property was never made a form of felony punishment in
16. 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §127, at 901-02 (4th ed. 1971); S.
SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH §1:1, at 2 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
SPEISER].
20. See, ag, Smith v. Sykes, 89 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B. 1677); Higgins v. Butcher, 80 Eng. Rep.
61 (K.B. 1606). The House of Lords confirmed that the rule of Baker v. Bolton did derive from the
felony-merger doctrine. See Admiralty Comm'rs v. S.S. Amerika, [1917] A.C. 38; SPEISER, supra
note 19, §1:2, at 7 & n.7.
21. See, e.g., Connecticut Mut. Ins. Co. v. New York & New Haven R.R. Co., 25 Conn. 265,
272-73 (1856); Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180 (1867); SPEISER, supra note 19, §1:4, at 11-12 & nn.28
& 29.
22. See Eden v. Lexington & Frankfort R.R. Co., 53 Ky. 165 (1853); SPEISER, supra note 19,
§1:4, at 12-13.
23. See Hay, Death as a Civil Cause ofAction in Massachusetts, 7 HARv. L. REv. 170, 171
(1893). See generally Smedley, Wrong/Id Death-Bases of the Common Law, 13 VAND. L. REV.
605 (1960); SPEISER, supra note 19, §1:2, at 6-7 & n.7.
24. See Hay, supra, at 171-72.
25. See SPEISER, supra note 19, §1:2, at 6 & nn.5 & 6.
26. See SPEISER, supra note 19, §1:2, at 6-8; 61 A.L.R.3d 906, 908 (1975).
27. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 383 (1970).
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this country.28 The assets of a defendant always have been available to
satisfy a civil judgment for damages in the United States, and it is not
infrequent for one act to give rise to both criminal and civil liability.
In their efforts to rationalize the denial of a civil action for tortious
death, the American courts explained that the idea of compensating for
the loss of human life in money was "revolting. ' 29 In addition, the
courts stated that "[t]he impossibility of calculating the pecuniary value
of a life is a sufficient reason for denying recovery in wrongful death
actions. '30 These arguments lose much of their force when it is realized
that they were advanced after Lord Campbell's Act31 created a right of
action for wrongful death in England.32 Thus, courts were already as-
sessing damages for these injuries. Furthermore, calculation of the loss
sustained by the dependents or the estate of the deceased under present
wrongful death statutes is no more difficult than calculation of damages
for many non-fatal personal injuries.3 Compensating for loss of
human life in dollars, therefore, is no longer a revolting nor an impossi-
ble task.
The courts also have suggested that the prohibition of a civil action
for tortious death derived support from the maxim actio personalis
moritur cumpersona; that is, that personal actions are extinguished with
the death of a decedent.34 The principle is now universally recognized
as pertaining only to the personal claims of the decedent and has no
bearing on whether a person, other than the decedent, should be per-
mitted to recover for pecuniary loss suffered as a result of the tortious
death of the decedent.3 5
Thus, the explanations by the courts do not support a denial of a
common law remedy for wrongful death.36 The common law rule has
been called "barbarous" by some commentators37 and criticized se-
verely by most.38 Although many courts have voiced their disapproval
28. See id. at 384.
29. See Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180 (1867); SPEISER, supra note 19, §1:4, at 12 & n.29.
30. SPEISER, supra note 19, § 1:4, at 12 & nn.28-30. See generally Van Beeck v. Sabine Tow-
ing Co., 300 U.S. 342 (1937); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & New Haven R.R. Co.,
25 Conn. 265 (1856).
31. Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93.
32. See SPEISER, supra note 19, §1:4, at 12.
33. 398 U.S. at 385; see Hollyday v. The David Reeves, 12 F. Cas. 386, 388 (Case No. 6,625)
(D.C. Md. 1879); Green v. Hudson River R.R. Co., 28 Barb. 9, 17-18 (N.Y. 1858).
34. See 398 U.S. at 385; Eden v. Lexington & Frankfort R.R. Co., 53 Ky. 165, 167 (1853);
Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 906, 908 (1975).
35. See F. POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS 53 (P. Landon ed. 1951); Holdsworth, The Origin ofthe
Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. REv. 431, 435 (1916); Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in
Tort, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 239, 250, 253 (1929).
36. See notes 23-35 and accompanying text supra.
37. See F. BuPRDICK, TORTS 291 (4th ed. 1926); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 676-77 (3d ed. 1927); F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 55 (P. Landon ed. 1951).
38. Dean Prosser concluded that the common law rule made it "more profitable to kill the
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of the rule, they have nevertheless continued to apply it.39 In fact, it
was not until 1970 that the United States Supreme Court disputed the
historical justifications for the denial of the existence of a common law
cause of action for wrongful death.4"
B. "he Moragne Decision-Rejection of the Common Law Rule
In Moragne v. States Marine Lines,4 the United States Supreme
Court recognized a common law cause of action for wrongful death in
general maritime law.42 Justice Harlan, in his majority opinion,
reached the following conclusions concerning the historical basis for
the common law rule: (1) the continued denial of a cause of action for
wrongful death in the United States was based on a set of factors that
had "long since been thrown into disregard even in England;"43
(2) American courts have failed to produce any satisfactory justifica-
tion for the common law rule;" and (3) "[t]he most likely reason the
English rule was adopted in the United States without much question is
simply that it had the blessing of age."4 Once the historical basis for
the common law rule was nullified, the Court held that a civil action
for wrongful death could exist in the absence of congressional intent to
occupy the field of recovery. 6
The Moragne Court cited numerous federal and state statutes47 that
permit recovery for wrongful death and asserted that the statutes evi-
denced "a, wide rejection by the legislatures of whatever justifications
may once have existed for a general refusal to allow such recovery. 48
The Court found "no present public policy against allowing recovery
for wrongful death.' 49 Furthermore, the Court declared that the legis-
plaintiff than scratch him." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS §127, at 902 (4th ed.
1971). Professor Smedley states that the common law rule depends more on historical considera-
tions than on logical reasons, and that the rule was finally confirmed in the common law at a
relatively late date and largely by judicial accident. See Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases ofthe
Common Law, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605, 606-09 (1960); R BAUER, DAMAGES 414 (1919).
39. Although recognizing and applying the common law rule denying recovery for wrongful
death, the court, in Gu/, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Beall, 91 Tex. 310, 42 S.W. 1054 (1897),
noted that vigorous protests had been made against it and none of the various reasons assigned to
support it seemed entirely satisfactory. See generally, Bedore v. Newton-i 54 N.H. 117 (1893);
Rowe v. Richards, 35 S.D. 201, 151 N.W. 1001 (1915). See 61 A.L.R.3d 906, 912-13.
40. See generally Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
41. Id.
42. See id. at 379-81, 404-09. Moragne overrules prior authority established in T7he Harris.
burg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
43. See 398 U.S. at 381.
44. See id. at 384-85.
45. Id. at 386.
46. Id. at 393.
47. Every American state now has a remedy for wrongful death. See Comment, Wrongful
Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REv. 402, 437-39 (1966).
48. See 398 U.S. at 390.
49. Id.
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lative establishment of policy carries significance and is given weight
not only in matters of statutory construction but also in those of deci-
sional law." The Court recognized that it is the duty of the judiciary to
recognize the significance of major legislative innovations and to incor-
porate "the new legislative policies into the inherited body of common
law principles-many of them deriving from earlier legislative exer-
tions."5 Professor Landis, quoted in Moragne, noted that "much of
what is ordinarily regarded as 'common law' finds its source in legisla-
tive enactment."52 Thus, the Court held that a judicially created rem-
edy for wrongful death exists under general maritime law in the absence
of legislative intent to occupy thefield of recovery. 53 The common law
rule denying a cause of action for wrongful death was abrogated.
The Court, in determining whether the legislature has evidenced an
intent to occupy the field of recovery, used the following test:
The legislature does not, of course, merely enact general policies. By
the terms of a statute, it also indicates its conception of the sphere
within which the policy is to have effect. In many cases the scope of a
statute may relect nothing more than the dimensions of the particular
problem that came to the attention of the legislature, inviting the conclu-
sion that the legislativepolicy is equally applicable to other situations in
which the mischiefis identical The conclusion is reinforced where there
exists not one enactment but a course of legislation dealing with a series
of situations .... On the other hand, the legislature may, in order to
promote other, conflicting interests, prescribe with particularity the
compass of the legislative aim, erecting a strong inference that terri-
tories beyond the boundaries so drawn are not to feel the impact of
the new legislative dispensation.54
In addition, the Court stressed that there must be an "affirmative" indi-
cation of legislative intent to occupy the field to preclude judicial initia-
tive in wrongful death actions.55
An application of this test led the Court to conclude that Congress
has not evidenced an affirmative intent to preclude judicial develop-
ment in the field of recovery for tortious death.5 6 The Moragne Court
thoroughly analyzed the pattern of congressional enactments57 con-
50. See id. at 390-91.
51. See id. at 392.
52. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources f/the Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213, 214(1934) [hereinafter cited as Landis] quoted in 398 U.S. at 392.
53. See 398 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added).
54. 398 U.S. at 392 (emphasis added). Professor Landis stated that "[a] course of legislation
dealing continuously with a series of instances can be made to unfold a principle of action as
easily as the sporadic judgments of courts." Landis, supra note 52, at 222. See generally Landis,
supra note 52, at 215-16, 220-22.
55. See 398 U.S. at 393.
56. See id. at 393, 402.
57. See generally id. at 393-403.
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cerning wrongful death actions in maritime law and found that the fed-
eral legislation was intended to ensure the availability of a cause of
action for wrongful death in territorial waters.58 For example, the
Court held that the Death on the High Seas Act59 was specifically
designed not to preempt the entire field.60 Thus, a common law remedy
for tortious death was recognized by the United States Supreme
Court.6 '
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Gaudette v.
Webb,62 followed the M4oragne analysis and held that the wrongful
death remedy is of common law origin.63 The Gaudette court noted the
lack of any discernible basis for the common law doctrine of Baker v.
Bolton6I and the harsh results it frequently produced.65 After consider-
ing the Moragne decision and its reasoning, 66 the Gaudette court con-
cluded that in Massachusetts the right to recover for tortious death was
derived from the common law.67
C. The California Response to Moragne
In 1977, with Justus v. Atchison,68 the California Supreme Court de-
nied the parents of an unborn fetus an action for wrongful death.6 9
The court based its refusal to extend the remedy on its determination
that the California Legislature intended to occupy the field of recovery
for wrongful death.70  The denial of the extension of the remedy to
parents of an unborn fetus may have been justified on other grounds, 7'
58. See id. at 397.
59. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1976). See also 46 U.S.C. §688 (1976).
60. See 398 U.S. at 398.
61. See id. at 393.
62. 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972).
63. See id. at 71, 284 N.E.2d at 229.
64. See notes 16-19 and accompanying text supra.
65. See 362 Mass. at 69, 284 N.E.2d at 228.
66. See 398 U.S. at 381-82, 386, 390 quoted in 362 Mass. at 69-71, 284 N.E.2d at 228-29.
67. See 362 Mass. at 71, 284 N.E.2d at 229.
68. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
69. See id. at 580, 565 P.2d at 132, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
70. See id. at 575-79, 565 P.2d at 129-32, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 104-07.
71. Justice Tobriner, in his concurring opinion, suggests that the denial of a cause of action
for the wrongful death of a fetus could have been based on the California Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
See 19 Cal. 3d at 586-87, 565 P.2d at 137, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 112. In Borer, the primary reason for
the denial to a child of a cause of action for the loss of consortium of an injured parent was the
court's recognition that "social policy must at some point intervene to delimit liability." 19 Cal.
3d at 446, 563 P.2d at 861, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 305. The court explained:
Loss of consortium is an intangible, nonpecuniary loss; monetary compensation will not
enable plaintiffs to regain the companionship and guidance of a mother; it will simply
establish a fund so that upon reaching adulthood, when plaintiffs will be less in need of
maternal guidance, they will be unusually wealthy men and women. . . . []n reality
they have suffered a loss for which they can never be compensated; they have obtained,
instead, a future benefit essentially unrelated to that loss.
We cannot ignore the social burden of providing damages for loss of parental consor-
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but the rationale underlying the decision requires examination.
The Atchison court accepted the test for determining legislative in-
tent used in Mforagne.72 Accordingly, two alternatives could character-
ize the creating and amending of the wrongful death statute enacted
and amended by the California Legislature: the legislature intended to
enunciate a general policy, allowing the courts to determine specific
applications or the legislature intended to regulate the entire field of
recovery for wrongful death, allowing the courts no room for modifica-
tion.73 A very brief analysis of the legislative history of the wrongful
death statute led the court to conclude that the legislature intended to
"occupy the field of recovery" for wrongful death.74 In support of its
position, the court stated:
Whether or not the belief [that the common law denied a cause of
action for wrongful death] was well founded, it was so widely held
that we must presume the legislature acted upon it. Accordingly,
their intent in adopting the 1862 statute,75 and its successor section
377, was manifestly to create an entirely new cause of action where
none was thought to exist before.76
In addition, the court briefly noted that the California statute was
available to remedy a broad spectrum of tortious conduct,7 7 -in contrast
with the limited scope of the federal wrongful death acts analyzed in
Moragne.78 Furthermore, the court emphasized that the legislature
had amended the wrongful death statute numerous times, regulating
the remedy in increasing detail.79 The court went on to state that "[i]n
tium merely because the money to pay such awards comes initially from the 'negligent'
defendant or his insurer. Realistically the burden of payment of awards for loss of con-
sortium must be borne by the public generally in increksed insurance premiums or,
otherwise, in the enhanced danger that accrues from the greater number of people who
may choose to go without any insurance. We must also take into account the cost of
administration of a system to determine and pay consortium awards; since virtually
every serious injury to a parent would engender a claim for loss of consortium on behalf
of each of his or her children, the expense of settling or litigating such claims would be
sizable.
19 Cal. 3d at 447, 563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
72. Compare 398 U.S. at 392-93 with 19 Cal. 3d at 574, 565 P.2d at 128, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
73. See 19 Cal. 3d at 574, 565 P.2d at 128, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
74. See id. at 574-75, 565 P.2d at 128-29, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 103-04.
75. See CAL. STATS. 1862, c. 330, §§1-4, at 447.
76. See 19 Cal. 3d at 574, 565 P.2d at 128-29, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 103-04.
77. The Atchison court stated:
mhe statute is made broadly applicable to any intentional or negligent death of 'a per-
son'; it authorizes a damage action by his heirs or personal representatives against the
wrongdoer or, if he is deceased, against his personal representative; it permits various
joinders of parties and consolidations of actions when appropriate; it specifies the nature
and method of distribution of the damages; and it provides an elaborate list of the classes
of individuals who are entitled to bring such an action.
Id. at 574, 565 P.2d at 129, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
78. See id. Compare id. at 574, 565 P.2d at 129, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 104 with 398 U.S. at 393-
403.
79. See 19 Cal. 3d at 574, 565 P.2d at 129, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
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these circumstances we are persuaded that the legislature intends to oc-
cupy the field of recovery for wrongful death."8 The court concluded,
for these reasons, that "the remedy remains a creature of statute in Cal-
ifornia, '8 1 and therefore the cause of action for wrongful death "exists
only so far and in favor of such person as the legislative power may
declare."82 Thus, the California Supreme Court, though unable to at-
tack the soundness of the reasoning in Moragne,8 3 refused to extend a
common law remedy to parents for the wrongful death of their stillborn
fetus.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF CALIFORNIA'S
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION
The Moragne court held that a common law cause of action for
wrongful death exists in the absence of an affirmative legislative intent
to occupy the field of recovery.' The Atchison court adopted the
Moragne test85 but determined that the legislature had given an affirm-
ative indication of its intent to occupy the field.86 This determination
was used by the courts in their refusal to extend the wrongful death
action to the meretricious spouse.8 7 If the determination of legislative
intent in Atchison is found to be erroneous, the California Supreme
Court could grant meretricious spouses the right to recover in wrongful
death actions. Consequently, it is necessary to examine the Atchison
decision and the legislative developments in the field of wrongful death
recovery in California.
A. Legislative History of the California Wrongful Death Statute
Although the result in Atchison could have been justified on other
grounds,88 the court based the denial of a common law remedy for
wrongful death on its analysis of legislative intent.89 A closer analysis
of the history and policy of the California statute reveals that the Atchi-
son court's interpretation of legislative intent is erroneous. An exami-
80. Id. at 575, 565 P.2d at 129, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting Pritchard v. Whitney Estate Co., 164 Cal. 564, 568, 129 P. 989, 992 (1913)).
83. See id. at 573, 565 P.2d at 128, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
84. See notes 42-55 and accompaning text supra.
85. See note 72 supra.
86. See notes 72-82 and accompanying text supra.
87. See Aspinall v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 625 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1980); Vogel v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 224, 225-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Harrod v. Pacific South-
west Airlines, Inc., 118 Cal. App. 3d 155, 173 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1981).
88. See note 71 supra. The wrongful death of a fetus is a wholly intangible injury and mone-
tary recovery can provide no real compensation. Consequently, a new cause of action for the
wrongful death of a fetus should not be recognized. See 19 Cal. 3d at 586, 565 P.2d at 136, 139
Cal. Rptr. at 111 (robriner, J., concurring).
89. See notes 72-82 and accompanying text supra.
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nation of the legislative history of the wrongful death statute indicates
that the California Legislature has gradually expanded the right of re-
covery under the statute to meet new situations and conditions.
Prior to 1968, the California wrongful death statute limited the right
to bring an action for tortious death to the heirs90 of a decedent. 91 In
1968, the California Legislature expanded the class of persons entitled
to bring an action for wrongful death to include dependent92 parents of
the deceased. 93 The legislative action was a belated cure for results
similar to those reached in Evans v. Shanklin.94 In Evans, the court
denied the dependent mother of a decedent the right to a wrongful
death remedy, although the decedent had been under a statutory duty
to provide for her.95 The amendment enabled dependent parents, who
survive the tortious death of their child, to obtain those benefits likely
to accompany the parent-child relationship. The 1968 amendment is
evidence of the recognition by the California Legislature of the close
financial and emotional bonds between parent and child.
In 1975, the wrongful death statute was amended to expand further
the class of persons entitled to bring a wrongful death action.96 The
1975 amendment authorized the putative spouse who was dependent
on the decedent, dependent children of the putative spouse, and depen-
dent stepchildren of the decedent to bring an action for tortious
death.97 The inclusion of the putative spouse of the decedent in the
class of persons entitled to bring the action reflects the acceptance by
the legislature of the holding in Kunakoff v. Woods.98 In Kunakoff, the
court allowed a putative spouse, who qualified as an heir under the
laws of intestate succession, to be considered an heir for purposes of the
wrongful death statute.99
The 1975 amendment also extended the wrongful death remedy to
children of the putative spouse who were dependent on the decedent
90. The heirs of a decedent are those entitled to succeed at death to the estate of the decedent
in case of intestacy. See Dickey v. Walrond, 200 Cal. 335, 253 P. 706 (1927); In re Estate of
Riccomi, 185 Cal. 458, 197 P. 97 (1921); Hochstein v. Berghauser, 123 Cal. 681, 56 P. 547 (1899).
See generally CAL. PROB. CODE §§200-258 (succession).
91. See CAL. STATS. 1961, c. 657, §5, at 1869 (amending CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §377).
92. A dependent is an individual over one-half of whose support was received from the tax-
payer. See I.R.C. §152(a); CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §17056.
93. Compare CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 766, §1, at 1488 (amending CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §377)
with CAL. STATS. 1961, c. 657, §5, at 1869.
94. 16 Cal. App. 2d 358, 60 P.2d 554 (1936). See Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d 115,
121 n.4, 524 P.2d 801, 804 n.4, 115 Cal. Rptr. 329, 332 n.4 (1974).
95. See 16 Cal. App. 2d at 362-63, 60 P.2d at 556; CAL. CIV. CODE §206 (duty of support).
96. Compare CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1241, §5.5, at 3189-90 (amending CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE
§377) and CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 334, §2, at 784 with CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 766, §1, at 1488.
97. See CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1241, §5.5, at 3190. See generally 7 PAC. L.., REVIEW OF SE-
LECTED 1975 CALIFoRNiA LEGISLATION 562 (1976) (Torts; wrongful death).
98. 166 Cal. App. 2d 59, 332 P.2d 773 (1958).
99. See 166 Cal. App. 2d at 67-68, 332 P.2d at 778.
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and to dependent stepchildren of the decedent. '00 There is no require-
ment that the children of the putative spouse be related in any way to
the decedent or qualify as an heir under the California Probate
Code.'0' The inclusion of the dependent stepchildren of the decedent
in the class was intended to alter the rule in Steed v. Imperial Air-
lines. 02 The court, in Steed, held that the dependent stepchild of the
deceased could not bring an action for wrongful death because she was
not an heir under the statutory rules of intestate succession.10 3
In 1977, the California Legislature amended the Code of Civil Proce-
dure to include, within the class of persons who may maintain an ac-
tion for wrongful death, minors who resided in the household of the
decedent at the time of, and 180 days previous to, the death of the
decedent and who were dependent upon the decedent for at least one-
half of their support." The minors need not be related to the decedent
to bring the wrongful death action. 0 5 The intent of the legislature in
enacting the 1977 amendment was apparently to protect economically
and emotionally dependent minors, who do not qualify as heirs, from
any injustice resulting from their inability to bring an action for the
wrongful death of decedents from whom they previously had received
support. 106
In summary, the California Legislature has amended the wrongful
death statute three times since 1967, authorizing five new categories of
persons to maintain an action for tortious death.'07 The 1968 amend-
ment was a legislative response to the court's refusal in Evans to extend
the wrongful death action to dependent parents. 08 The 1975 amend-
ment was an express rejection of the refusal by the Steed court to ex-
tend the cause of action to dependent stepchildren 0 9 and an acceptance
of the decision by the court in Kunakoff to extend the remedy to puta-
tive spouses."l 0 In addition, by allowing recovery for children of a pu-
tative spouse who are dependent on the decedent,"' the 1975
amendment manifests the legislature's intent to discard a test based
100. See CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1241, §5.5, at 3189-90.
101. See 1d. See note 90 supra.
102. See CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 334, §2, at 784.
103. See 12 Cal. 3d at 122-23, 524 P.2d at 805-06, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 333-34.
104. See CAL. STAT. 1977, c. 792, §1, at 2436-37. See generally 9 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF
SELECTED 1977 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 672 (1978) (rons; wrongful death plaintiffs).
105. See CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 792, §1, at 2436-37.
106. See generally STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, COMM. ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
ANNUAL REPORT, Item 7 (1976); STATE BA OF CALIFORNIA, 1975 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 3-
3; 9 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1977 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 672, 674 (1978).
107. See notes 90-106 and accompanying text supra.
108. See notes 92-95 and accompanying text supra.
109. See notes 102-103 and accompanying text supra.
110. See notes 98-99 and accompanying text supra.
111. See notes 100-101 and accompanying text supra.
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solely on heirship to qualify for recovery under the statute. E1 2 This in-
tent is further evidenced by the extension of the remedy, pursuant to
the 1977 amendment, to minors residing with the decedent who were
dependent on the decedent for over one-half of their support." l3
Since dependent stepchildren, dependent children of putative
spouses, and "dependent minors" may have no established legal rela-
tionship with the decedent, the legislature apparently has supplemented
the "heirship" test with an "injury" test. In Steed, the court stated:
It seems without dispute that the class of those who suffer the greatest
loss upon a wrongful death are the heirs of the deceased. Heirs are
those who, as a class, stand in the closest relationship to a deceased.
This is not to say that in all instances persons who are not in the class
may not suffer equal or greater losses than some who are within the
class, but the Legislature is not compelled to anticipate and provide
for such persons.1
14
In view of the rapid legislative response to Steed,"15 it is apparent that
the wrongful death action is intended to be used by those who are in a
close relationship with the decedent and are injured by the decedent's
death. The meretricious couple, by definition,' 6 is a family relation-
ship. The close emotional and financial bonds that normally attend a
family relationship are no less injured by virtue of the lack of participa-
tion by the couple in a formal marriage ceremony.
B. The Determination of Legislative Intent
In Atchison, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that the
determination of legislative intent should be made by applying the
Moragne test." 7 In support of its determination that the legislature
intended to occupy the field of recovery for wrongful death, the Atchi-
son court stressed that the legislature had amended the statute numer-
ous times, "regulating the remedy in ever greater detail."" 8 In
addition, the court found that the California Legislature structured the
wrongful death statute to be generally applicable to a variety of situa-
tions, in contrast with the limited scope of the wrongful death legisla-
tion reviewed in Moragne."9
112. 7 PAC. LJ., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1975 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 562, 564 (1976).
113. See notes 104-106 and accompanying text supra.
114. Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d 115, 124, 524 P.2d 801, 806, 115 Cal. Rptr. 329, 334
(1974) (footnote omitted).
115. The California Legislature approved the 1975 amendment only eleven months after the
decision in Steed. Compare Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d 115, 524 P.2d 801, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 329 with CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1241, §5.5, at 3189-90 and CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 334, §2, at 784.
116. See note 2 supra.
117. See notes 72-73 and accompanying text supra.
118. See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
119. See notes 77-79 and accompanying text supra.
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The frequent legislative amendments which "regulate the remedy in
ever greater detail" do not support the determination of legislative in-
tent by the Atchison court. The test used in Moragne specified that
when the scope of a statute reflects "nothing more than the dimensions
of the particular problem that came to the attention of the legisla-
ture,"' 2 the courts are invited to apply legislative policy to situations in
which the injury is identical.' The Moragne court further explained
that this invitation "is reinforced where-there exists not one enactment
but a course of legislation dealing with a series of situations."' 122 In its
analysis of the legislative history of the California Wrongful Death Act,
the court ignored the statement of legislative intent in the 1975 amend-
ment;123 the amendment clearly expressed that the extension of the
remedy to dependent stepchildren was a direct response to the holding
in Steed. 24 This expression of legislative intent certainly qualifies as a
reflection of "nothing more than the dimensions of the particular prob-
lem that came to the attention of the legislature."'' 2  Other legislative
extensions of the remedy, such as the putative spouse, dependent chil-
dren of the putative spouse, dependent parents, and dependent minor
children, evidence a "course of legislation dealing with a series of situa-
tions."' 26 The Atchison court failed to recognize that these enactments
evidence a general policy allowing recovery when the injury is similar
to those already covered by the statute. Justice Burke, dissenting in
Steed, stated:
In my view, the [1968] amendment 127 illustrates a legislative policy
to permit such actions by all persons who have incurred damages
substantially identical to those incurred by decedent's heirs at law.
[T]hat statute cannot have the effect of excluding persons. . . who
suffer an injury from decedent's death that is both emotionally and
economically indistinguishable from that suffered by a natural
child. 12 8
The dissent by Justice Burke takes on added significance in view of the
rapid legislative response that is in accord with his opinion.
129
120. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
121. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
122. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
123. See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cat 3d 564, 574-75, 565 P.2d 122, 128-29, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97,
103-04 (1977).
124. See CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 334, §2, at 784.
125. Compare id with Landis, supra note 52, at 215-16, 220-22 quoted in Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970).
126. See notes 88-116 and accompanying text supra.
127. See notes 90-95 and accompanying text supra.
128. Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d 115, 127-28, 524 P.2d 801, 809, 115 Cal. Rptr. 329,
337 (1974) (Burke, .., dissenting) (citation omitted).
129. See note 115 supra.
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The Moragne test also included a provision requiring the existence of
an affirmative indication of intent to preclude judicial extension of the
remedy. 3 Even if the California Supreme Court was unable to dis-
cern a specific legislative policy from its analysis of the legislative his-
tory of the Wrongful Death Act, it is difficult to perceive how the court
satisfies the "affirmative indication" aspect of the Moragne test. There
is no express indication in the statute that the legislature intends to
occupy the field of recovery. 131 In addition, the lack of an indication of
implied intent to preclude judicial extension of the remedy makes it
especially difficult to discern any compliance with the "affirmative indi-
cation of intent" requirement of the test. Moreover, even if implied
intent could satisfy the affirmative intent requirement, the pattern of
legislative enactments evidences an implied intent to allow the judici-
ary to grant the remedy to persons who incur damages similar to those
actionable by persons currently entitled to maintain a wrongful death
action. 32 Justice Tobriner concurred in the result reached by the ma-
jority in Atchison but not in the majority's reasoning.
I am unable to divine an affirmative legislative intent topreclude fur-
ther judicial development. I find nothing in the statute or its history
which anticipates and forbids the evolution of recovery for wrongful
death into a universally recognized right of common law status. Ju-
dicial expansion and refinement of legal concepts characterizes the
common law-any legislative intent to foreclose such traditional ju-
dicial activity should require positive expression.' 33
The Atchison court also relied on the "phrasing" of the California
statute as support for its determination of legislative intent.'34 The
court, however, cited those portions of the statute detailing the catego-
ries of torts the legislature deemed actionable, not the classes ofpersons
entitled to maintain an action.' 35 The availability of a wrongful death
action for the benefit of an increasing number of categories of plaintiffs
to remedy a broad spectrum of torts is the result of the continued
amending of the statute by the California Legislature. Thus, the ra-
tionale of the court, in using the "phrasing" of the statute as support for
the determination of legislative intent to preclude judicial expansion of
the remedy to a new category of persons, is flawed.
In sum, a detailed examination of the legislative history of the Cali-
fornia Wrongful Death Act reveals that the conclusion by the court in
130. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
131. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §377.
132. See notes 120-129 and accompanying text supra.
133. Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 586, 565 P.2d 122, 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, Ill (1977)
(Tobriner, J., concurring).
134. See id. at 574, 565 P.2d at 129, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
135. See 19 Cal. 3d at 572 n.8, 574, 565 P.2d at 127 n.8, 129, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 102 n.8, 104.
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Atchison is not well founded. The application of the Moragne test
gives no indication that the California Legislature intends to preclude
judicial extension of the wrongful death remedy to a new category of
persons. 136
The practical effect of finding that the legislature has not manifested
an intent to occupy the field is the potential for inclusion of the meretri-
cious spouse within the class of persons entitled to bring wrongful
death action. Before suggesting the methods the courts can use to allow
the meretricious spouse to bring an action for wrongful death, this com-
ment will examine the inequitable results that have been caused by a
refusal to extend the wrongful death action to the meretricious spouse.
DENIAL OF THE WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION TO THE
MERETRICIOUS SPOUSE
Three federal courts applying California law have denied the wrong-
ful death remedy to common law and meretricious spouses.13 7 The in-
equity of the current status of the law in California can be illustrated
best by reviewing these cases.
In the 1976 case of In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974,138 the
federal district court denied the wrongful death remedy to the common
law wives of persons who were killed in an airplane crash.'39 Califor-
nia law was applicable to all issues in the Paris Air Crash cases.' 40
Thus, common law wives effectively were denied any remedy for the
tortious death of their spouses.
In the 1978 case of Vogel v. Pan Am. World Air-Ways, Inc., 14 the
court denied a meretricious spouse the wrongful death remedy.' 42 The
plaintiff in Vogel was at one time married to the decedent. Shortly
after a formal dissolution of marriage and up until the date of death of
the decedent, plaintiff and decedent were living together in a meretri-
cious relationship. 43 The court granted the motion of defendant air
carrier for summary judgment.' 44
Aspinall v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,145 decided in 1980, is the most
136. See notes 120-135 and accompanying text supra.
137. See Aspinall v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 625 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1980); Vogel v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Paris Air Crash of March 3,
1974, 420 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc., 118 Cal. App.
3d 155, 173 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1981).
138. 420 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
139. See id. at 881-82.
140. See id. at 881.
141. 450 F. Supp. 224.
142. See id. at 227.
143. See id. at 225.
144. See id. at 227.
145. 625 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1980).
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striking example of the inequity in the law of recovery for wrongful
death in California. In Aspinall, the appellant brought an action to re-
cover for the death of her meretricious spouse.'46 At the time of his
death, the decedent had no collateral heirs 47 and his parents were de-
ceased. 148 The couple had lived together in England in the roles of
husband and wife for over four years and the decedent left his entire
estate to appellant by will.' 49 Except for a small pension, the decedent
had constituted the sole support of appellant and her children during
the meretricious relationship.150 The court held that neither the appel-
lant, as a common law wife under the laws of England, nor her chil-
dren' 5' had standing to maintain an action under the California
Wrongful Death Act.'52
In the 1981 case of Harrod v. Pacfc Southwest Airlines, Inc. , the
court denied a meretricious spouse the wrongful death remedy. 5 4 The
plaintiff in Harrod had been living with the decedent for over one and
one-half years and was engaged to be married to her. Plaintiff and
decedent pooled their earnings and had agreed to share equally the
property acquired during their relationship. About a month before the
decedent's death, they bought a house, taking title in both names; both
contributed to the down payment, and each agreed to contribute to the
mortgage payments.1 55 The court affirmed the trial court order dis-
missing the action.' 56
In Paris Air Crash, common law spouses of persons tortiously killed
were denied the wrongful death remedy. 157 These plaintiffs were mar-
ried pursuant to the law of the jurisdiction in which they were resi-
dents. The court, however, looked to the participation by the plaintiffs
in a conventional marriage ceremony 158 and not to the reality of their
relationships to the decedents. The court failed to recognize that the
surviving meretricious spouses suffered the same injury and had the
same expectations as a legally married person who had lost his or her
spouse through tortious death.
146. See id. at 326.
147. See note 90 supra.
148. See 625 F.2d at 326.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. When the cause of action arose, Section 377 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
had not been amended to include, within the class of persons entitled to maintain an action for
wrongful death, "dependent minors." See notes 104-106 and accompanying text supra.
152. See 625 F.2d at 327-28.
153. 118 Cal. App. 3d 155, 173 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1981).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 157, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
156. Id. at 158, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
157. See In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 420 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
158. See id. at 881.
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The pattern of legislation in the field of wrongful death evidenced
the intent of the California Legislature to allow a cause of action if
there exists an injury to the financial "bonds" of a family relation-
ship. 159 Since the only distinction between a legally married couple
and a meretricious couple may be the lack of participation in a formal
ceremony by the latter, it is unreasonable for the courts to deny the
meretricious spouse a cause of action for wrongful death. In addition,
the degree of stability of the family bonds created by a legally married
couple are not per se more stable than those created by a meretricious
couple. The greater than one million divorces granted in the United
States in 1975 alone160 supports the conclusion that the expectations of
continuing benefits of a meretricious spouse are not per se less reason-
able than those of a formally married spouse.
Professor Weyrauch has identified two major policy reasons for the
reluctance of legislatures and courts to grant property rights to meretri-
cious couples. 161 First, official recognition of cohabitation without sat-
isfying the formalities of marriage would legitimatize promiscuity. t62
Second, official recognition of unmarried cohabitors as well as unre-
corded common law marriages results in confusion of public records
and possible clouding of land titles. 163
A denial of the wrongful death remedy to a meretricious spouse
based on its possible contravention of morality is no longer supported
by California case law. The California Supreme Court, in Marvin v.
Marvin,' 4 concluded that "[t]he mores of society have indeed changed
so radically in regard to cohabitation that we cannot impose a standard
based on alleged moral considerations that have apparently been so
widely abandoned by so many."'l6  The Marvin court recognized that
earlier court holdings equated the meretricious relationship with prosti-
tution and that such a holding today would "do violence to an accepted
and wholly different practice."' 66 In support of this position, the Mar-
vin court indicated its awareness that from 1960 to 1970 there had been
an 800% increase in the number of meretricious living arrangements. 67
159. See notes 91-116 and accompanying text supra.
160. See PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES DEP'T, 3 VITAL STA-
TISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1976, Marriage and Divorce, table 2-1, at 2-5 (1980).
161. See Weyrauch, supra note 14, at 88-89, 96-100.
162. See Weyrauch, supra note 14, at 97-98; Comment, Common Law Marriage and Unmar-
ried Cohabitatiom .4n Old Solution to a New Problem, 39 U. Prrr. L. REv. 579, 581 (1978).
163. See Weyrauch, supra note 14, at 99; Comment, Common Law Marriage and Unmarried
Cohabitatiom An Old Solution to a New Problem, 39 U. Pir. L. REV. 579, 581 (1978).
164. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
165. See id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
166. See 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
167. See id. at 665 n.1, 557 P.2d at 109 n.1, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 818 n.1. Compare U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2 CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1970 SUBJECT REPORTS, FI-
NAL REPORT PC(2)-4B, PERSONS BY FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS, table 11, at 152-54 (1973) with
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Furthermore, statistics compiled after the Marvin case was decided
show that between 1970 and 1978 there has been a greater than 250%
increase in the number of persons sharing living quarters with members
of the opposite sex. 168 If the California Supreme Court could admit on
the basis of the statistics it had before it that the mores of society have
so changed in regard to cohabitation, then the newer statistics ought to
compel it to disregard completely the "fear of legitimatizing promiscu-
ity" as a valid justification for refusing to extend an action for tortious
death to the meretricious spouse.
The confusion of public records resulting from cohabitation with a
member of the opposite sex is a valid argument for denying property
rights to both common law and meretricious spouses. 16 9 In addition,
the public health and welfare objectives in requiring a health certificate
as a condition precedent to a marriage license may be frustrated if
physical examination can be evaded by entering into an informal rela-
tionship. 170  Arguments such as these must be weighed against the
harsh results which can befall parties who are denied any remedy at all
because their union has not been conventionally solemnized.171
Although the state may espouse a public policy promoting formal-
ized marital relations, the social trend, as evidenced by both legislative
and judicial action, 171 is to recognize that marriage is no longer a pre-
requisite to legal rights and privileges traditionally granted to married
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2 CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960 SUBJECT
REPORTS, FINAL REPORT PC(2)-4B, PERSONS BY FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS, table 15, at 137-38
(1964).
168. Compare U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES, table 56, at 43 (100th ed. 1979) with U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, 2 CENSUS OF POPULATIONS: 1970 SUBJECT REPORTS, FINAL REPORT PC(2)-4B,
PERSONS BY FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS, table 11, at 152-54 (1973).
169. See Weyrauch, supra note 14, at 99.
170. See Weyrauch, supra note 14, at 99.
171. See generally Weyrauch, supra note 14, at 109. The Harrod court, in holding that the
wrongful death statute does not deny a meretricious spouse equal protection of the laws, expressed
several policy considerations that could justify a legislature in placing such a limitation on the
right to recover for wrongful death. See note 15 supra. The Harrod court, of course, proceeded on
the premise that the California Legislature had expressed its intention to preclude judicial exten-
sion of the wrongful death remedy. Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc., 118 Cal. App. 3d
155, 156, 173 Cal. Rptr. 68, 69 (1981). The issue arises, however, whether these policy considera-
tions could be used to defeat the meretricious spouse's right to recover under legal theories other
than equal protection.
Problems of proof and dangers of fraudulent claims should not prove too challenging to a judi-
cial system that has been assessing the credibility of witnesses for over 200 years. If the term
"meretricious spouse" is defined adequately, see note 2 supra, the "proof and fraudulent claims"
problems should be no more difficult than other fact findings made by the courts. Moreover,
neither the California Legislature nor the California courts have used these policy considerations
to distinguish married spouses from meretricious spouses in the fields of housing, credit for hous-
ing, family relations, and contracts. See notes 3-6 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion
addressing the "permanence of a relationship as necessary to recover for future damages" and the
"state interest in promoting marriage" see notes 164-170 and accompanying text supra.
172. See notes 3-7 and accompanying text supra.
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persons. The state cannot ignore the increasingly large percentage of
the population that has chosen to live without the nuptial sanctions of
the state. 173 The state does have some interest in regulating marital
relationships, however the current status of California law inflicts too
harsh a punishment on the meretricious spouse. The policy justifica-
tions for denying the meretricious spouse a cause of action for wrongful
death are either no longer applicable or substantially outweighed by
their inequitable effects. Thus, the greater state interest lies in provid-
ing relief to persons injured by wrongful acts.
EXTENSION OF THE WRONGFUL DEATH REMEDY TO THE
MERETRICIOUS SPOUSE
Once the barriers prohibiting the extension of the wrongful death
action to meretricious spouses are overcome, the courts could grant the
remedy through either of two means. First, the courts could create a
common law remedy for wrongful death independent of the statutory
remedy. 74 In Atchison, the California Supreme Court acknowledged
its duty to modify common law doctrine to keep pace with new condi-
tions. 175 The meretricious relationship has been already recognized by
the court as an accepted 176 and rapidly growing 77 practice.
Alternatively, the courts could exercise their duty to construe the
provisions of the Wrongful Death Act liberally17 8 and "with a view to
effect its objects and promote justice." 179 The legislative purpose in im-
posing such a duty on the courts is to render the wrongful death statute
susceptible of easy adaptation to promote justice.18 ' Thus, the courts
have the authority to extend the wrongful death remedy to the meretri-
cious spouse181 and the duty to exercise that authority.18 2
CONCLUSION
Meretricious spouses represent a growing segment of the population
and are being treated harshly and inequitably by the California courts'
173. See notes 167-168 and accompanying text supra.
174. See SPEISER, supra note 19, §1:6, at 17.
175. See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 572, 565 P.2d 122, 127, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102. See
also Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
176. See note 166 and accompanying text supra.
177. See notes 167-168 and accompanying text supra.
178. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §4 (rule of construction).
179. Id.; see 19 Cal. 3d at 579, 565 P.2d at 132, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 107; Bond v. United States R.
Rs., 159 Cal. 270, 276, 113 P. 366, 369 (1911).
180. See Code Commissioner's Notes, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §4, at 8-9 (West 1954 ed.). The
duty of the California courts is imposed by statute to abrogate the common law rule to strictly
construe statutes in derogation of the common law. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §4.
181. See notes 120-135 and accompanying text supra.
182. See notes 175, 178-179 and accompanying text supra.
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application of the Wrongful Death Act. Thepolicy justifications for the
denial of the remedy to the meretricious spouse are either substantially
outweighed by the harsh results of maintaining such a policy or com-
pletely outmoded. The legal justification for denial of the remedy to
the meretricious spouse is based on an erroneous determination of leg-
islative intent by the California Supreme Court. Because of this error,
the California courts have failed in their obligations to modify the com-
mon law and to liberally construe the wrongful death statute. The
courts have the power and the duty to extend the wrongful death rem-
edy to effect the objects of the statute and to promote justice. Judicial
expansion of the wrongful death remedy to include the meretricious
spouse within the class of persons entitled to bring the action is a logi-
cal and necessary response to changing mores of society.
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